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Abstract 
Efficiency wage effects of profit sharing are combined with option values related 
to stochastic future pofit variations. These option effects occur if the workers’ 
profit share is fixed by long-term contracts. The Pareto-improving optimal level 
of the sharing ratio is calculated for two different scenarios. First, if the firm can 
unilaterally decide, the expected present value of net profits is maximised. 
Second, if the sharing ratio is based on bilateral Nash bargaining. Since a larger 
variation of revenues implies a higher redistribution of future profits, the 
inclusion of expected variations results in a lower worker’s profit ratio in both 
scenarios. 
JEL-Code: D81, J33 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since high wages can be a device to increase motivation and productivity of 
workers, some firms find it profitable to offer an extra pay in excess of the 
workers’ reservation wage in order to elicit more effort. These “efficiency wages” 
may arise due to unobservable individual effort (in the so-called ‘shirking 
version’): the firm (principal) – unable to monitor individual effort – can try to 
increase productivity of the employees (agents) through incentives based on the 
remuneration scheme. (For an overview see LEVINE [1989]). If this extra pay is 
not a fixed payment but based on sharing the firm’s profits with the employees, 
these incentive effects are even amplified, since now the productivity benefits of 
cooperation partly flow to the workers, and because the marginal benefits of 
shirking are reduced. Thus, efficiency wages based on profit sharing (PS) may 
be an adequate instrument (see LIN, CHANG & LAI [ 2002] for an overview of the 
synthesis of profit sharing and efficiency wages). The positive productivity 
effects of giving a share of the profit as an extra payment to the workers are 
corroborated empirically (WADHWANI & WALL [1990], KRUSE [1992], SESSIONS 
[2008]). Extra Payments based on PS in addition to a fixed base wage can be 
used autonomously as an incentive instrument by a firm or can be the result of 
a bilateral bargaining process of the firm with a worker or with the union (for 
aspects of efficiency wages and bargaining see POHJOLA [1987] and SANFEY 
[1993]). Frequently, profit sharing schemes are fixed not only for the present 
period, but are based on a long-run commitment of the firm. However, the firm 
has to keep in mind that future profits are stochastically uncertain (KOSKELA & 
STENBACKA [2004]). Moreover, profit sharing is usually limited to positive profits, 
while negative profits will lead to a market exit of the firm and consequently to 
firing of the workforce. Thus, a commitment to a long-term PS scheme actually 
implies that a firm gives an option to the worker: If the future turns out to be 
advantageous, high profits will be shared with the worker, however, in an 
unfavourable future shared profits are downwards limited to zero. Since the 
negative realisations of the stochastic process of future profits are truncated, 
the money which is expected to be given to the workers as a share of the profits 
is the more, the larger is the expected revenue variation. Anticipation of this 
option effect by the firm leads to a more reluctant attitude towards PS by the 
firm, the more variable the revenues are. In this paper a simple model is 
presented describing these option/variation effects on voluntary “long-term” PS 
schemes based on unilateral firm decisions as well as on bilateral Nash 
bargaining. 
Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 
2 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In section 2. a simple formulation of 
positive productivity effects due to sharing profits is presented. In section 3. this 
productivity effect is integrated into a short-run scenario, where the relation 
between present revenues and Pareto improvement due to profit sharing is 
analysed. The consequences of uncertain future revenues in long-run PS 
schemes are addressed in section 4. Section 5. concludes. 
 
 
2 A SIMPLE MODEL OF PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS DUE TO PROFIT 
SHARING 
A price-taking firm produces a final product using one unit of labour input (i.e. 
one employee). This worker has the opportunity to receive a standard market 
wage w if (s)he works under the conditions of the standard wage agreement 
without profit sharing, either in our firm or in another firm. This outside 
opportunity of the worker serves as the base wage w in our analysis and is, as a 
numéraire, normalised to unity: w = 1. The firm has the opportunity to give the 
employee a share of its profit as an extra compensation in addition to the 
standard wage w in order to encourage the employee to work harder. The larger 
the worker’s ratio λ of the profit, the higher is the incentive to work hard, and 
thus, the higher is the productivity of labour. As the reciprocal of productivity, 
the input coefficient is a decreasing function of the worker’s sharing ratio λ. 
(1) α = α(λ,·)     with   ∂α∂λ ≤ 0 λ ∈ [0,  1] 
Since the standard wage w is normalised to unity, the input coefficient α equals 
the unit ‘base labour costs’ (excluding the worker’s profit share). In order to 
keep the mathematics as simple as possible and to be able to calculate closed 
form solutions the following simple functional form of the labour input coefficient 
resp. the unit labour costs α is assumed: 
(2) α = α(λ,η) = 11 + η ⋅ λ      η ∈ [0,  1[ 
 with: α : input coefficient of labour = unit labour costs 
  λ : worker’s sharing ratio of the profit (= share parameter) 
  η : efficiency parameter of PS 
The more effective profit sharing is – i.e. the more severe the monitoring 
problems without extra monetary incentives are –, the larger is the efficiency 
parameter η in eq. (2), i.e. the lower are the unit labour costs in a situation with 
profit sharing. Due to the normalisation of the base wage (w = 1) these ‘base’ 
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unit labour costs are normalised to one for a situation without profit sharing [i.e. 
 α(λ=0) = 1 ]. 
Selling the final product in the current period t, the firm receives the price pt.  
The profit per unit of the product is (pt – α). A single worker is able to produce 
more than one unit of the product if the productivity increases, i.e. if the input 
coefficient decreases: The production quantity of a single worker is  xt = (1 / α) 
and the profit per employee is  xt ⋅ (pt – α) and – corrected by the ‘dilution effect’ 
due to the employee’s profit sharing ratio λ – in period t the firm’s current net 
profit Rt is: 
(3) Rt = (1 – λ) ⋅ 
pt – α
α   =  (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pt – 1 ] 
In absence of any firing and hiring costs the firm will be active on the product 
market (and employ a worker), if the profit Rt is positive and leave the market if 
the profit is negative. The price level which triggers the market exit can be 
calculated via zero profit: 
(4) Rt = 0     ⇔     pt = α =  11 + η ⋅ λ  
with:  market exit and firing the worker  if  pt < α 
The firm reacts with an firing strategy if the price level falls short of the unit 
labour costs α. 
 
 
3 DETERMINATION OF THE WORKER’S PROFIT SHARE IN A 
“SHORT-TERM” SITUATION 
We start with a situation, where the firm decides about PS as an incentive 
device only in the current period t. Thus, we have a short-term situation, where 
all relevant factors (e.g. the product price level pt) are known. I.e. in the short 
run we have a situation with certainty. 
3.1 Profit sharing as a Pareto improvement 
Sharing the firm’s profits brings about an incentive effect and increases the 
productivity of labour. Thus, paying an extra compensation exceeding the 
standard wage may be profitable for both – the worker and the firm. We assume 
that the worker may get a share of the profits as an efficiency wage premium in 
addition to the standard/market wage w, as an extra compensation for working 
harder. Since both, the firm and the worker, have to opt for PS voluntarily, 
contracts including shared profits as an efficiency premium will only result if 
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both contracting parties are better off, i.e. if PS results in a Pareto-superior 
situation compared to a standard market wage compensation. 
The firm will prefer profit sharing (λ > 0) to a situation with merely a standard 
wage compensation (λ = 0) if – after correcting for the ‘profit dilution’ due to the 
worker’s share – an additional ‘net’ profit results for the firm. This extra net profit 
Zt due to the incentive/productivity effect of sharing profits compared to an 
alternative without PS is to be differentiated concerning two different cases: 
case [a], where price level pt is high, so that producing the product is profitable 
anyway, with or without PS. In this case [a] the two relevant opportunities of the 
firm are: being active on the market with PS compared to be active without PS. 
In case [b], the price level is low so that only the cost reducing efficiency effects 
of PS are ensuring profitability. In case [b] the alternatives are: activity with PS 
compared to not being active at all (with zero profit). Since  Rt(λ=0) = pt – 1 , 
the borderline price between both cases is  pt = 1. 
(5) Zt = Rt(λ>0) – Rt(λ=0)  =  (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pt – 1 ]  –  D(pt) ⋅ [ pt – 1 ] 
with a binary variable:   D(pt > 1) = 1     ⇔  case [a] 
 D(pt ≤ 1) = 0     ⇔  case [b] 
The firm prefers PS to a standard wage compensation, if the extra profit Zt of 
PS is positive. If the price level is very high, the ‘dilution effect’ of sharing profits 
(which is negative from the firm’s point of view) is larger than the labour cost 
reduction via the ‘incentive effect’. Thus, a price ceiling exists, at which PS 
becomes unattractive for a very profitable firm. Hence, in case [a] (pt > 1) and 
for a high price level, PS is only beneficial for the firm if Zt > 0. 
(6) Zt > 0  ⇒  firm prefers PS if  pt < pf  ,  with   pf = 11 – η ⋅ (1 – λ) ≥ 1 
A worker will agree to a compensation including shared profits if the entire 
compensation exceeds the standard wage (w = 1) and if, additionally, a 
reimbursement for the disutility of working harder due to PS is paid. Since a 
higher λ is related to a lower labour input coefficient α, the disutility of working 
harder is positively related to the profit share λ. A disutility parameter (θ ≥ 1) is 
multiplied by productivity/effort parameters (η ⋅ λ) in order to capture the 
disutility effect [θ ⋅ (η ⋅ λ)]. The worker’s premium Lt resulting from PS – 
corrected by the disutility effect – has to be positive in order to make PS 
preferable for the worker. Thus, the worker’s implicit lowest-price limit pw at 
which (s)he will accept a PS contract instead of a standard wage contract is: 
(7) Lt = 
λ
1 – λ ⋅ Rt – θ ⋅ (η ⋅ λ)  =  λ ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pt – 1 ] – θ ⋅ η ⋅ λ   > 0     
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 with  θ ≥ 0 
Lt > 0  ⇒  worker prefers PS if  pt > pw  , 
 with   pw = 
1 + η ⋅ θ
1 + η ⋅ λ = α ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ θ) 
The unit labour costs α multiplied by an ‘effort cost’ factor (1 + η ⋅ θ) determine 
the worker’s price floor for favourable profit sharing. 
To sum up, in the case of effective incentives (η > 0), both the firm and the 
worker may be better off by profit sharing. An extra efficiency compensation 
exceeding the standard wage w is Pareto-superior if: 
(8) pw  <  pt  <  pf     ⇔     1 + η ⋅ θ1 + η ⋅ λ  <  pt  <  
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ) 
A sufficient condition for the existence of a real range  pw < pf  with Pareto-
superiority of PS is: ( η > 0  ∧  θ < 1 ). 
3.2 Firm alone decides about profit sharing 
Since shared profits are given voluntarily by the firm as an efficiency wage 
premium in addition to the worker’s opportunity wage w, we now assume that 
the firm has unilaterally the right to determine the level of the ratio λ of its profits 
which is given as a bonus to the worker. Correspondingly, the worker has the 
right to accept the PS efficiency wage contract based on the share level λ 
offered by our firm, or to turn down the offer and to opt for a standard/market 
wage contract. 
If the firm wants to utilise the efficiency effect of PS it can decide upon the 
magnitude of the share λ of the profits which is given to the worker. The level of 
the worker’s sharing ratio λ is chosen by the firm so as to maximise the value of 
the firm’s net profit. This profit-maximising ratio λcf  can be calculated via the first 
order condition: 
(9) FOC:   
∂Zt
∂λ  = 0     ⇒     λ
c
f  =  
1 – pt + η ⋅ pt
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pt   =  
1
2 – 
1
2 ⋅ η + 
1
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pt 
⇔   pt = 1
1 – η +2 ⋅ η ⋅ λcf
 restrictions:   pt∈ [α,  pf]  ⇔  λcf  ∈ [0,  1] 
The profit maximising ratio λcf  is decreasing in the product price pt; and for 
pt = 1 this ratio is ½. If the price level approaches the firm’s “Pareto price 
ceiling” pf, the profit-maximising λcf  approaches 0, and for prices above pf 
sharing very high profits is not attractive for the firm due to the very expensive 
dilution effect. If the price equals the unit costs α, the profit is 0, and thus the 
(from the firm’s point of view) optimal ratio λcf  is 1. However, the range of PS is 
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limited by the acceptance of the worker. Substituting pt by the workers “Pareto 
floor price” pw in the FOC in equation (9) and solving for λ results in: 
(10) pt ≥ pw   ⇔   λcf  ≤ λcmax      with   λcmax =  1 – θ + η ⋅ θ1 + 2 ⋅ η ⋅ θ  
Profit-maximising PS is (relative to a standard wage compensation) an 
advantage for the worker if the price level exceeds pw, which implies that the 
corresponding profit-maximising ratio is below λcmax. This ensures that the 
worker’s profit share is large enough to compensate for her/his burden of 
working harder. 
3.3 Negotiated profit sharing 
Alternatively, the determination of the share parameter λ may be the result of a 
bilateral negotiation of the firm and the worker. We assume a Nash bargaining 
solution based on maximising the following Nash product Nt: 
(11) Nt := Zt ⋅ Lt       with   maxλ (Nt)     FOC:  
∂Nt
∂λ  = 0   ⇒   solution: λ
c
N 
The solution of the FOC in case [a] (with pt > 1) is:  
(11 a) λc,[a]N  =  
 
The solution for case [b] (pt ≤ 1) was computed in closed form, however, the 
expression is to extensive. For a simple situation without any disutility effect the 
solution for case [b] is: 
(11 b) λc,[b]N,(θ=0) =           for case [b]  
and  θ = 0 
(11 c) The borderline between both cases [a] and [b] is:  λab =  
 
Fig. 1 shows the sharing ratio λ (on the abscissa) as a response to different 
price levels p = pt (on the ordinate), for Nash bargaining (λcN) and for net-profit 
maximisation (λcf ). Additionally, the Pareto-borders are depicted: The distance 
between the firm’s price ceiling pf and the worker’s price floor pw shows the 
range of Pareto-improvements by PS. This distance is the larger, the larger the 
PS-efficiency parameter η and the smaller the disutility parameter θ of working 
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harder is. The Nash bargaining solution is “kinked” at p = 1, where the 
alternative cases [a] and [b] are changing. For every price level p the resulting 
sharing ratio under Nash bargaining λcN exceeds the profit-maximising ratio λcf . 
The higher the price level, the more dominant becomes the ‘dilution effect’, and 
so the profit-maximising sharing ratio as well as the Nash sharing ratio are 
decreasing in the price level. 
Fig. 1:  Simulation for net-profit maximisation of the firm and for 
Nash bargaining 
(η = 1/2 , θ = 1/4) 
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4 UNCERTAINTY AND “LONG-TERM” PROFIT SHARING 
CONTRACTS 
Instead of determining the share parameter only for the current period t, a “long-
term” PS contract fixes the ratio λ not only for the present period t but also for a 
second period t+1 (i.e. the “future”) as well. However, since we allow for 
stochastic price variations, the future price level pt+1 and the future profit Rt+1 
is unknown at the moment when the PS ratio λ is permanently fixed by a 
contract. 
4.1 A simple stochastic variation as an example 
The following extension of the model is designed to illustrate the impact of 
stochastic variations of the future price level. However, in our simplistic model 
we merely analyse the effects of an expected one-time discrete binomial shock. 
By applying this very simple stochastic change, we are able to show how (and 
in which direction) the inclusion of option effects qualitatively alter our results 
concerning (1) the Pareto-superior price range under PS contracts, and (2) 
concerning the profit-maximising or the negotiated ratio λ of the profits a worker 
will receive. Thus, our model can be seen as a simplistic example provided to 
show the qualitative effects of sharing option values. These effects would 
remain in a more realistic/sophisticated framework (with e.g. ongoing 
uncertainty, under application of a time-continuous stochastic process). 
However, with our simple modelling, we are able to apply simple algebraic 
methods instead of using dynamic programming techniques, and we are able to 
calculate simple closed form analytical solutions. 
We assume a binomial stochastic process: Both, the firm and the worker, 
expect a non-recurring single stochastic change with an absolute size of ε ≥ 0, 
which can be either positive (+ε) with probability W, or a negative (–ε) change, 
with probability (1 – W). 
(12) pt+1 = pt ± ε  ⇒ Et(pt+1) = W ⋅ (pt + ε) + (1 – W) ⋅ (pt – ε)  =  pt + (2 ⋅ W – 1) ⋅ ε 
We assume that the planning horizon of the firm is two periods only: the current 
period t and the “future” (t+1). 
4.2 Options of an active firm 
The expected present value of the firm is the probability-weighted average of 
the present values of both stochastic ε-realisations. Concerning the present 
price level three possible situations are relevant. 
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Situation 1: ( α + ε < pt ). If in period t the price level exceeds (α + ε), the firm 
will earn a positive profit in both periods, even in the case of a negative (–ε)-
realisation. Thus, the firm will continue its activity in period t+1 in any case. 
Situation 2: ( α < pt < α + ε ). The firm is active in period t, Conditional on a 
positive (+ε)-change, which has the probability W, the firm will stay active in 
period t+1. Conditional on a negative (–ε)-realisation, which has the probability 
(1 – W), the firm will use its option to leave the market in t+1, since then the 
price level is below the unit labour costs α. 
Situation 3: ( α – ε < pt < α ). In the current period the price level pt is below the 
cost level α. However, the firm will enter the market in t+1 if a positive (+ε)-
change will occur, and will (with probability W) earn positive future profits. 
In order to be able to use a single general notation for all three situations, a 
formulation using an average price is applied. In situation 2 (α < pt < α + ε), the 
firm is active in period t with probability 1 and in period t+1 with probability W. 
We calculate a weighted average price level over both periods, conditional on 
market activity. The weights are 1 for the present and the probability W 
multiplied by a discount/weighting factor δ for future variables. This probability 
weighted average price level pa2 is: 
(13) situation 2 ( α < pt < α + ε ): pa2 = 11 + δ⋅W ⋅ [1 ⋅ pt + δ⋅W ⋅ (pt + ε) ] = pt 
+ 
δ⋅W ⋅ ε
1 + δ⋅W 
In situation 1 (pt > α + ε), the firm is active in both periods t and t+1 with 
probability 1. The probability weighted average price level pa1 is: 
(14) situation 1 ( pt > α + ε ): 
pa1 = 
1
1 + δ ⋅ [ pt + δ ⋅ W ⋅ (pt + ε) + δ ⋅ (1 – W) ⋅ (pt – ε)]  =  pt + 
δ ⋅ (2⋅W – 1) ⋅ ε
1 + δ  
In situation 3 (α – ε < pt < α) the firm is inactive in period t, and with probability 
W active in t+1. Conditional on market activity, the probability weighted average 
price level pa3 is: 
(15) situation 3  (α – ε < pt < α):   pa3 = 1W ⋅ [ W ⋅ (pt + ε) ]  =  pt + ε 
The expected present value V1 of the firm in situation 1 is the current profit Rt 
plus the discounted expected profit in the next period Et(Rt+1): 
(16) situation 1 (pt > α + ε): 
Et(Rt+1) = (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ Et(pt+1) – 1 ] 
 = Rt + (1 – λ) ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (2 ⋅ W – 1) ⋅ ε 
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⇒ V1 = Rt + δ ⋅ Et(R1,t+1) 
 = (1 + δ) ⋅ Rt + δ ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (2 ⋅ W – 1) ⋅ ε 
⇔ V1  = (1 + δ) ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pa1 – 1 ] 
Expected present value V2 of the firm in situation 2 is the current profit Rt plus a 
positive future profit in case of a (+ε)-realisation, with probability W: 
(17) situation 2 (α < pt < α + ε): 
Et(Rt+1) = W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (pt + ε) – 1 ] 
⇒ V2 = Rt + δ ⋅ Et(Rt+1) 
 = (1 + δ ⋅ W) ⋅ Rt + δ ⋅ W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ ε 
⇔ V2 = (1 + δ ⋅ W) ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pa2 – 1 ] 
Expected present value V3 of the firm in situation 3 is a zero current profit plus 
a positive future profit in case of a (+ε)-change: 
(18) situation 3 (α – ε < pt < α): 
V3 = δ ⋅ Et(Rt+1)  =   δ ⋅ W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ (pt + ε) – 1 ] 
⇔ V3 = δ ⋅ W ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pa3 – 1 ] 
A general formulation representing all situations (i = 1,  2,  3) of the expected 
present value is: 
(19) Vi = Ci ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pai – 1 ] 
with a constant   Ci (i = 1,  2,  3):  C1 = (1 + δ) ,  C2 = (1 + δ ⋅ W) ,  C3 = δ ⋅ W 
4.3 “Long-term” PS contracts and Pareto improvement 
A risk-neutral firm will prefer profit sharing (λ > 0) to a situation with merely a 
standard wage compensation (λ = 0) if – after correcting for the employee’s 
profit share – an additional “net” expected present value Zi results for the firm. 
In the alternative without PS (λ = 0) the expected present value Vi is positive for 
pai > 1 . Thus, the net gain Zi from PS is: 
(20) Zi = Vi(λ>0) – Vi(λ=0)  =  Ci ⋅ (1 – λ) ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pai – 1 ]  –  D(pai) ⋅ [ pai – 1 ] 
with a binary dummy:  D(pai > 1) = 1     ⇔  case [a] 
    D(pai ≤ 1) = 0     ⇔  case [b] 
The firm prefers PS if the extra present value Zi of PS is positive: 
(21) Zi > 0   if   pai < 
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ)     ⇒    firm prefers PS if  pai < pf 
The workers are risk-neutral as well and have the same expectations as the 
firm. A worker agrees to PS if the expected compensation exceeds the standard 
wage compensation plus a reimbursement for the disutility of working harder. 
The worker’s expected premium Li resulting from PS has to be positive. Thus, 
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the worker’s implicit lowest-price limit at which (s)he will accept a PS contract 
instead of a standard wage contract is: 
(22) Li = Ci ⋅ { λ ⋅ [ (1 + η ⋅ λ) ⋅ pai – 1 ] – θ ⋅ η ⋅ λ }  > 0 
⇒   worker prefers PS if   pai >  pw = 1 + η ⋅ θ1 + η ⋅ λ =  α ⋅ (1 + η ⋅ θ) 
Analogous to the short-term case under certainty (from section 3.), both the firm 
and the worker can be better off by PS. A “long-term” contract with a time 
invariant fixed profit share λ is Pareto-superior if: 
(23) pw  <  pai  <  pf    ⇔     1 + η ⋅ θ1 + η ⋅ λ  <  pai  <  
1
1 – η ⋅ (1 – λ) 
If the firm unilaterally can decide upon the magnitude of the time-invariant ratio 
λ of the profits which is given to the worker, λ is chosen by the firm so as to 
maximise the expected present value Zi: 
(24) FOC:   
∂Zi
∂λ  = 0     ⇒     λ
u
f  =  
1 – pai + η ⋅ pai
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pai   =  
1
2 – 
1
2 ⋅ η + 
1
2 ⋅ η ⋅ pai 
⇔   pai = 1
1 – η + 2 ⋅ η ⋅ λuf
 
This is similar to the solution of the short-term case in eq. (9), if the present 
period price pt is replced by the weighted average price pai. 
Alternatively, the determination of the sharing ratio λ may be the result of a 
bilateral negotiation of the firm with the worker. We again assume a Nash 
bargaining based on maximising the following “long-term” Nash product Ni: 
(25) Ni := Zi ⋅ Li       with   maxλ (Ni)     FOC:  
∂Ni
∂λ  = 0   ⇒   solution: λ
u
N 
Again, the long-term solution λuN is analogous to the short-term solution in eq. 
(11), if the current price p = pt is replaced by the weighted average price pai. 
The short-term case – without any uncertainty about the current price – can be 
interpreted as a special case of situation i = 1, with a zero uncertainty level: 
ε = 0. Thus, the general solution for all cases is given by eqs. (19) to (25). A 
graphical representation of all situations (i = 1, 2, 3) would resemble Fig. 1, if 
instead of the current price p = pt the average price level pai is stated on the 
ordinate. A representation of all situations in one diagram based on the current 
price level pt would shift all graphs vertically downwards by an extent of si, 
depending on the situation: 
(26) pt = pai – si    with:  s1 = 
δ ⋅ (2⋅W – 1) ⋅ ε
1 + δ   ,  s2 = 
δ⋅W ⋅ ε
1 + δ⋅W  ,  s3 = ε 
A numerical simulation of the Nash bargaining solution is shown in Fig. 2 by a 
(p,λ)-diagram and the corresponding profit-maximising solution is illustrated in 
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Fig. 3. The reaction of the share parameter λ on the current price level is 
discontinuous at the borderline between the three relevant situations: the unit 
costs-curve α, separating situation 2 and 3, and at the curve for (α + ε), 
separating situation 1 and 2. As it is obvious in both figures, the vertical shift of 
the relations between pt and the resultant profit ratio λuN or λuf  is equivalent to a 
shift of all these graphs to the left, eventually resulting in lower sharing ratios. In 
situation 1, with a high price level, the firm will continue to employ the worker in 
the future even in case of a negative (–ε)-change. Though the level of future 
profits is uncertain, however, in situation 1 continuing the activity is certain. In 
situation 2, where the price is below (α + ε), the firm will exit the market and fire 
the worker in case of a negative (–ε)-realisation, however, for a positive (+ε)-
change the profits will be shared. In this situation 2 the firm does not only share 
current profits, but with the long-term PS contract the firm additionally gives the 
worker an option to share high future profits in case of (+ε) – and 
simultaneously ensures not to share low profits (or even losses) if in the future a 
negative (–ε)-realisation will occur. Since the negative realisation with low 
profits is truncated, and since only very profitable realisations are resulting in 
effective production and actual profit sharing, in situation 2 the firm is more 
reluctant to fix a high sharing ratio λ in a long-term PS contract. This option 
effect dominates in situation 3, where the firm is currently not employing the 
worker, but with a chance of future employment if a (+ε)-realisation will 
eventuate. In situation 3, via permanently fixing λ in advance by a long-term PS 
scheme, the firm has no advantage for the current period, but only gives the 
worker an option to participate in future profits, conditional on the case that 
these profits are high. Consequently, under uncertainty the firm is very reluctant 
to fix high sharing ratios for future employees. In situations 2 and 3, where 
these options on future profits are relevant, the shift downwards (resp. to the 
left) is the stronger the larger the absolute level of uncertainty ε is. Furthermore, 
in situations 1 and 2, the firm prefers a low sharing ratio, if a positive future is 
very probable, i.e. if the probability W of a (+ε)-change is large. Moreover, with a 
larger ε, situations 2 and 3 are prevailing, since the distance between the 
borderlines α and (α + ε) increases. On the contrary, situation 1 prevails if the 
level of uncertainty ε is relatively low. A comparison to a situation with a lower 
level of uncertainty ε is illustrated in Fig. 4. 
Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 
13 
Fig. 2:  Illustration of “long-term” Nash bargaining λuN under 
uncertainty (η = 1/2 , θ = 1/4 , W = 1/2 , ε = 1/2, δ = 9/10) 
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Fig. 3: Illustration of “long-term” net-profit maximisation λuf  under 
uncertainty (η = 1/2 , θ = 1/4 , W = 1/2 , ε = 1/2,) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: “Long-term” Nash bargaining λuN and profit maximisation λuf  
with a low level of uncertainty (ε = 1/4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 
15 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this contribution a very simple model of profit sharing as an entrepreneurial 
instrument to create incentive-based productivity effects was presented. If 
efficiency gains result, a remuneration contract including shared profits as a 
premium pay in addition to the market wage is Pareto-superior: By sharing the 
efficiency gains, both parties, the firm and the worker, are better off compared 
to a standard wage regime. Furthermore, the efficiency gains due to sharing 
profits may result in stimulation of labour demand and employment, since the 
firm’s costs are reduced – though the worker receives a higher overall 
compensation. However, the focus of this paper is to combine efficiency effects 
of profit sharing with the impact of an option value which is based on the 
expected variation of stochastic future profits, if a long-term profit sharing 
scheme is ex-ante determined. An optimal remuneration policy was presented 
for two scenarios: First, the firm unilaterally offers a premium based on sharing 
profits in order to maximise the firm’s profits, and second, a bilateral Nash 
bargaining solution was computed. In both cases option value effects have to 
be considered by the firm when permanently determining an optimal 
instrumental level of the profit sharing ratio given to the worker. The inclusion of 
expected future revenue variations results in a lower worker’s profit sharing ratio 
– since a larger variation of revenue implies a higher redistribution of profits 
from firm to worker if a positive revenue change will occur in the future. In the 
case of a favourable future revenue development very high profits must be 
shared with the workers. In contrast, negative future outcomes are truncated, 
since future losses will not be shared because the firm uses its option to fire a 
worker in a loss situation, and since the worker has the option to leave the firm 
and to work elsewhere for the standard market wage. This is anticipated by the 
firm and results in a lower worker’s sharing ratio which the firm is willing to fix in 
a long-term wage contract if the sharing ratio is ex-ante determined and held 
constantly over a period of time. 
Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 
16 
6 REFERENCES 
ANDERSON, S., DEVEREUX, M. [1989], Profit Sharing and Optimal Labour 
Contracts. Canadian Journal of Economics, 89, 425–433. 
CHANG, J.-J. [2006], Profit Sharing, Risk Sharing, and Firm Size: Implications of 
Efficiency Wages. Small Business Economics, 27, 261-273. 
ELBAUM, B. [1995], The Share Economy with Efficiency Wages. Industrial 
Relations, 34, 299-323. 
KOSKELA, E., STENBACKA, R. [2004], Profit Sharing and Unemployment: An 
Approach with Bargaining and Efficiency-Wage Effects. JITE – Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160, 477-497. 
KRUSE, D.L. [1992], Profit Sharing and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence 
from the United States. Economic Journal, 102, 24-36. 
LEVINE, D.I. [1989], Efficiency Wages in Weitzman’s Share Economy. Industrial 
Relations, 28, 321-334. 
LIN, C.-C., CHANG, J.-J., LAI, C.-C. [2002], Profit sharing as a worker discipline 
device. Economic modelling, 19, 815-828 
POHJOLA, M. [1987], Profit Sharing, Collective Bargaining and Employment. JITE 
– Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 143, 334-342. 
SANFEY, P. J. [1993], On the Interaction between Efficiency Wages and Union-
Firm Bargaining Models, Economics Letters, 41, 319–324. 
SESSIONS, J.G. [2008], Wages, supervision and sharing. Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 48, 653-672. 
WADHWANI, S.B., WALL, M. [1990], The Effects of Profit Sharing on Employment, 
Wages, Stock Returns and Productivity: Evidence from UK micro-data. 
The Economic Journal, 100, 1-17. 
 
 17 
Bisherige Veröffentlichungen in dieser Reihe: 
No. 1 HERRMANN, R., KRAMB, M. C., MÖNNICH, Ch. (12.2000): Tariff Rate 
Quotas and the Economic Impacts of Agricultural Trade Liberalization in 
the WTO. (etwas revidierte Fassung erschienen in: "International 
Advances in Economic Research", Vol. 7 (2001), Nr. 1, S. 1-19.) 
No. 2 BOHNET, A., SCHRATZENSTALLER, M. (01.2001): Der Einfluss der 
Globalisierung auf staatliche Handlungsspielräume und die 
Zielverwirklichungsmöglichkeiten gesellschaftlicher Gruppen.  
 (erschienen in: "List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik", Bd. 
27(2001), H. 1, S. 1-21.) 
No. 3 KRAMB, M. C. (03.2001): Die Entscheidungen des "Dispute Settlement"-
Verfahrens der WTO im Hormonstreit zwischen der EU und den USA – 
Implikationen für den zukünftigen Umgang mit dem SPS-Abkommen. 
(überarbeitete Fassung erschienen in: "Agrarwirtschaft", Jg. 50, H. 3,  
S. 153-157.) 
No. 4 CHEN, J., GEMMER, M., TONG, J., KING, L., METZLER, M. (08.2001): 
Visualisation of Historical Flood and Drought Information (1100-1940) for 
the Middle Reaches of the Yangtze River Valley, P.R. China.  
 (erschienen in: Wu et al. (eds) Flood Defence '2002, Beijing, New York 
2002, pp. 802-808.) 
No. 5 SCHROETER, Ch. (11.2001): Consumer Attitudes towards Food Safety 
Risks Associated with Meat Processing. 
(geänderte und gekürzte Fassung ist erschienen unter Christiane 
SCHROETER, Karen P. PENNER, John A. FOX unter dem Titel "Consumer 
Perceptions of Three Food Safety Interventions Related to Meat 
Processing" in "Dairy, Food and Environmental Sanitation", Vol. 21, No. 
7, S. 570-581.) 
No. 6 MÖNNICH, Ch. (12.2001): Zollkontingente im Agrarsektor: Wie viel 
Liberalisierungsfortschritt? Ergebnisse und Diskussion einer Auswertung 
der EU-Daten.  (gekürzte Fassung erschienen in BROCKMEIER, M., 
ISERMEYER, F., von CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S. (Hrsg.), Liberalisierung des 
Weltagrarhandels - Strategien und Konsequenzen. "Schriften der 
Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues 
e.V.", Bd. 37(2002), S. 51-59.) 
No. 7 RUBIOLO, M. (01.2002): EU and Latin America: Biregionalism in a 
Globalizing World? 
No. 8 GAST, M. (02.2002): Zollkontingente bei US-amerikanischen 
Käseimporten.  
(gekürzte Fassung erschienen in: "Agrarwirtschaft", Jg. 51, H. 4, S. 192-
202.) 
No. 9 BISCHOFF, I. (08.2002): Efficiency-enhancing Effects of Private and 
Collective Enterprises in Transitional China. 
Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 
18 
No. 10 KÖTSCHAU, K. M., PAWLOWSKI, I., SCHMITZ, P. M. (01.2003): Die Policy 
Analysis Matrix (PAM) als Instrument zur Messung von 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Politikeinfluss - Zwischen Theorie und Praxis: 
Das Fallbeispiel einer ukrainischen Molkerei. 
No. 11 HERRMANN, R., MÖSER A. (06.2003): Price Variability or Rigidity in the 
Food-retailing Sector? Theoretical Analysis and Evidence from German 
Scanner Data. 
No. 12 TROUCHINE, A. (07.2003): Trinkwasserversorgung und Armut in 
Kasachstan: Aktueller Zustand und Wechselwirkungen. 
No. 13 WANG, R.; GIESE, E.; GAO, Q. (08.2003): Seespiegelschwankungen  
des Bosten-Sees (VR China). 
No. 14 BECKER, S.; GEMMER, M.; JIANG, T.; KE, CH.. (08.2003):  
20th Century Precipitation Trends in the Yangtze River Catchment. 
No. 15 GEMMER, M.; BECKER, S.; JIANG, T (11. 2003): 
Detection and Visualisation of Climate Trends in China. 
No. 16 MÖNNICH, Ch. (12.2003): 
Tariff Rate Quotas: Does Administration Matter? 
No. 17 GIESE, E.; MOßIG. I. (03.2004) 
Klimawandel in Zentralasien 
No. 18 GIESE, E.; SEHRING, J. TROUCHINE, A. (05.2004) 
Zwischenstaatliche Wassernutzungskonflikte in Zentralasien 
No. 19 DIKICH, A. N. (09.2004) 
Gletscherwasserressourcen der Issyk-Kul-Region (Kirgistan), ihr 
gegenwärtiger und zukünftiger Zustand 
No. 20 CHRISTIANSEN, TH.; SCHÖNER, U. (11.2004) 
Irrigation Areas and Irrigation Water Consumption in the Upper Ili 
Catchment, NW-China 
No. 21 NARIMANIDZE, E. et al. (04.2005) 
Bergbaubedingte Schwermetallbelastungen von Böden und 
Nutzpflanzen in einem Bewässerungsgebiet südlich von Tiflis/Georgien - 
Ausmaß, ökologische Bedeutung, Sanierungsstrategien 
No. 22 ROMANOVSKIJ, V.V.; KUZ’MIČENOK, V.A. (06.2005) 
Ursachen und Auswirkungen der Seespiegelschwankungen des Issyk-
Kul’ in jüngerer Zeit 
No. 23 ZITZMANN, K.; TROUCHINE, A. (07.2005) 
Die Landwirtschaft Zentralasiens im Transformationsprozess  
(nicht mehr lieferbar!) 
No. 24 SEHRING, J. (08.2005) 
Water User Associations (WUAs) in Kyrgyzstan -  
A Case Study on Institutional Reform in Local Irrigation Management 
No. 25 GIESE, E., MAMATKANOV, D. M. und WANG, R. (08.2005) 
Wasserressourcen und Wassernutzung im Flussbecken des Tarim 
(Autonome Region Xinjiang / VR China) 
 19 
No. 26 MOSSIG, I., RYBSKY, D. (08.2005) 
Die Erwärmung bodennaher Luftschichten in Zentralasien. Zur 
Problematik der Bestimmung von Trends und Langzeitkorrelationen 
No. 27 GAST, M.: (09.2005) 
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment of OECD Countries 1991-
2001 
(überarbeitete Fassung erschienen unter GAST, M. und HERRMANN, 
R., Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment of OECD Countries 1991-
2001 in „International Economic Journal”, Vol. 22, No.4, S. 509-524) 
No. 28 GIESE, E., TROUCHINE, A. (01.2006) 
Aktuelle Probleme der Energiewirtschaft und Energiepolitik in 
Zentralasien 
No. 29 SEHRING, J. (06.2006) 
The Politics of Irrigation Reform in Tajikistan 
No. 30 LANGENOHL, A. / WESTPHAL, K. (11.2006) 
Comparing and Inter-Relating the European Union and the Russian 
Federation. Viewpoints from an international and interdisciplinary 
students' project 
No. 31 WEBER, S./ ANDERS, S. (3.2007) 
Price Rigidity and Market Power in German Retailing 
(veränderte Fassung erschienen in “Managerial and Decision 
Economics”, Vol. 28, No. 7, S. 737-749) 
No. 32 GAVARDASHVILI, G. / SCHAEFER, M. / KING, L. (8.2007) 
Debris Flows at the River Mletis Khevi (Greater Caucasus Mountains, 
Georgia) and its Assessment Methods  
No. 33 TEUBER, R. (5.2007) 
Geographical Indications of Origin as a Tool of Product Differentiation –  
The Case of Coffee 
No. 34 DOSTAJ, Ž. D. (in Zusammenarbeit mit E. Giese und W. Hagg)  (6.2007) 
Wasserressourcen und deren Nutzung im Ili-Balchaš Becken 
No. 35 FLATAU, J./ Hart, V. / KAVALLARI, A./ SCHMITZ, P.M. (7.2007) 
Supply Chain Analysis of Olive Oil in Germany 
No. 36 HART, V. / KAVALLARI, A. / SCHMITZ, P.M. / WRONKA, T. (7.2007) 
Supply Chain Analysis of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables in Germany 
No. 37 MÖSER, N. (7.2008) 
Analyse der Präferenzen russischer Fachbesucher für ausgewählte 
Messeleistungen mit Hilfe der Choice-Based Conjoint-Analyse 
No. 38 BISCHOFF, I. / EGBERT, H. (8.2008) 
Bandwagon voting or false-consensus effect in voting experiments? First 
results and methodological limits 
No. 39 BREDL, S. / WINKER, P. / KÖTSCHAU, K. (12.2008) 
 A Statistical Approach to Detect Cheating Interviewers 
Efficiency Wages and Negotiated Profit-Sharing under Uncertainty 
20 
No. 40 HERRMANN, R. / MÖSER, A./ WEBER, S. (02.2009) 
 Grocery Retailing in Poland: Structural Changes and Foreign Direct 
Investment 
No. 41 HERRMANN, R. / MÖSER, A./ WEBER, S. (02.2009) 
 Grocery Retailing in Germany: Situation, Development and Pricing 
Strategies 
 
Stand 15. Mai 2009 
 
Die Diskussionsbeiträge können auf der Homepage des ZEU  
http://www.uni-giessen.de/zeu  
im Menü „Forschung“, „Veröffentlichungen“ kostenlos heruntergeladen werden. 
